March 3, 2026
General
Freya Grant

We live in a world where significant life decisions are discussed via WhatsApp. Marriages unravel over it. Business deals begin on it. Property negotiations often drift into it.
But can a WhatsApp message actually transfer a legal interest in property?
That was the question facing the High Court in Reid-Roberts v Mei-Lin.
The case arose in a personal insolvency context. The Court had to decide whether Mr Gudmundsson had disposed of his beneficial interest in a jointly owned property to his former wife before he was declared bankrupt. If he had, his trustee in bankruptcy would have no claim to that interest.
There were numerous exchanges between the parties — some by email, others by WhatsApp. In one message, he suggested:
“I suggest that the responsibility of taking care of the kids goes to u 100%, then I can sign over my share of southcote road to u without any complications…”
On the face of it, that looks fairly clear. But was it enough?
Judge Cawson concluded that the messages reflected a future intention to transfer the interest — not an immediate disposition. On the facts, therefore, no transfer had occurred.
However, the more interesting aspect of the judgment is what the Court did not dismiss.
Under section 53(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, a disposition of an equitable interest must be:
The Court accepted that a WhatsApp message could, in principle, satisfy the “in writing” requirement.
The difficulty was the signature.
The sender’s name appeared at the top of the WhatsApp chat — automatically generated by the platform. The Judge considered this analogous to an email header added by the service provider. It identified the sender, but it was incidental. It was not a deliberate signature forming part of the message itself.
As such, even if there had been sufficient intention, the statutory signature requirement would not have been met.
Crucially though, the Court did not rule out that a WhatsApp message could satisfy section 53(1) if the sender deliberately signed off their name within the message.
Earlier authority, including Hudson v Hathway, has already confirmed that emails can constitute a valid disposition where there is clear intention and an applied signature.
For insolvency practitioners, property lawyers and advisers, this case is a timely reminder that informal communications cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.
When analysing:
Reviewing WhatsApp and email correspondence may be essential.
In personal insolvency, where the matrimonial home is often the primary asset, the evidential value of digital communications can materially affect recoveries.
More broadly, the case highlights an ongoing tension: legislation drafted in 1925 is being interpreted in a world of instant messaging. The technology evolves; the statutory requirements remain.
As communication becomes increasingly informal, the legal consequences may not be.

